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Abstract
I study the effect of market incompleteness on the aggregate econ-
omy in a model where agents face idiosyncratic, uninsurable human
capital investment risk. The environment is a general equilibrium life-
cycle model with a version of a Ben-Porath (1967) human capital accu-
mulation technology, modified to incorporate risk. A CARA-normal
specification keeps endogenous decisions independent of individual
shock realizations. I study stationary equilibria of calibrated cases in
which idiosyncratic uninsurable risk arises from specialization risk and
career risk. Specialization risk is such that both mean and variance
of the return from training are increasing in the endogenous decision
to invest in human capital. In the case of career risk, however, only
the mean return is increasing in the decision to invest in human cap-
ital. With career risk only, stationary equilibria resemble those stud-
ied by Aiyagari (1994), and one concludes that the impact of uninsur-
able idiosyncratic risk is relatively small. With a significant amount
of specialization risk however, stationary equilibria are severely dis-
torted relative to a complete markets benchmark. One aspect of this
distortion is that human capital is only about 57 percent as large as
its complete markets counterpart. This suggests that the two types of
risk have very different and quantitatively significant general equilib-
rium implications. Keywords: Human capital risk, life-cycle, incom-
plete markets. JEL codes: E20, E21, E24.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Human capital risk
Dispersion of labor earnings increases over the life-cycle, a well documented
feature of the US data. According to Deaton and Paxson (1994), within-
cohort labor income inequality increaseswith age. In relatedwork, Huggett
Ventura and Yaron (2007) investigate the reasons behind this rise in earn-
ings dispersion over the life-cycle which is primarily due to age effects in
a partial equilibrium framework. Their study finds that about one-third
of the variation in lifetime earnings is due to idiosyncratic human capi-
tal shocks. Other cross sectional studies also indicate that agents face a
great deal of uncertainty when making their schooling decisions.1 Taken
together, it appears that investment in human capital is risky and part of
the labor income uncertainty that agents face over their life-cycle is a man-
ifestation of this idiosyncratic human capital risk. In addition, it is widely
understood that human capital investment is uninsurable—there is a clear
lack of complete markets with respect to this investment.
One main consequence of this type of labor income uncertainty is that
it could deter investment in human capital, possibly leading to underac-
cumulation of human capital and overaccumulation of relatively less risky
physical capital, in comparison to a case where agents can insure against
this risk via complete markets. If a mechanism like this is at work in actual
economies, the impact of market incompleteness on the aggregate econ-
omy could be large,2 possibly calling for policy intervention to mitigate the
1Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2003) find that the substantial heterogeneity in the
returns to schooling is unpredictable at the time when schooling decisions are made. In
related work, Cunha, Heckman, and Navaro (2005) conclude that 40% of the variability
in the returns to schooling is unforecastable at the time students decide to go to college,
implying that this uncertainty is not due to observable factors like ability differences or
differences in initial conditions but purely due to idiosyncratic shocks.
2Even more so if one takes the view that human capital is an engine of growth. With the
exception of few, Levhari and Weiss (1974), Eaton and Rosen (1980), Krebs (2003), Benabou
(2002), for example, this strand of the literature typically abstracts from the risky nature of
human capital investment.
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effect of this risk on household decisions to invest in training.3
I study the macroeconomic implications of labor income uncertainty
arising from the risky nature of human capital investment. The specifica-
tion here allows a direct analysis of the impact of risk on the process of
human capital accumulation, isolate and quantify the effect of risk on indi-
vidual decisions, and comment on divergent views in this literature on the
role of market incompleteness on the aggregate economy.
1.2 Main ideas
In this paper, investment in human capital is studied as a time allocation
problem in a life-cycle framework. Here agents allocate time away from the
labor market when they are young to acquire education. Using a version of
a Ben-Porath (1967) production function for human capital that allows for
risky human capital, I study how uninsurable risk impacts an individual’s
decision to train in a general equilibrium life-cycle model.4 If the returns
to training are uncertain and uninsurable, agents may try to self-insure by
holding larger precautionary savings and, more importantly, they may also
endogenously alter their training decisions to mitigate the effect of human
capital risk.
I consider two types of uninsurable idiosyncratic risks, namely, spe-
cialization risk and career risk. Higher risk is compensated by higher re-
turn, and higher return is often associated with higher levels of education.
In the formulation of the returns from training, this aspect of education
is captured by the specialization risk. The specialization risk is such that
the endogenous decision to train increases both the expected returns from
training and its variance, while the career risk only affects the mean return
3Krebs (2003) comes to this conclusion in an endogenous growth model where invest-
ment in risky human capital is modeled as a portfolio decision and physical capital is the
risk-free asset.
4I abstract from the risks associated with physical capital investment. Underlying this
assumption is the notion that for an individual human capital investment is more risky
than investment in physical capital. Typically investment in human capital cannot be easily
diversified or directly traded in the market since it is non-separable from the owner.
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from training. The career risk is additive in the human capital accumu-
lation technology and is the most common formulation in the literature
which studies the impact of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk on the aggre-
gate economy. Risks that look like the multiplicative specialization risk of
this paper were first studied by Angeletos and Calvet (2006), but not in a
human capital setting.
Market incompleteness arising because of these idiosyncratic uninsur-
able risks make the wealth distribution a relevant state for individual de-
cisions, often making problems in this class intractable. Several papers,
including Calvet (2001) and Angeletos and Calvet (2006), use constant ab-
solute risk aversion (CARA) utility function and normally distributed shocks
in order to ensure that an individual’s risk-taking decision is independent
of wealth. I employ the same technique along with certain other assump-
tions to ensure that an individual’s decisions are independent of wealth.
Due to the lack of wealth effects, within a generation all agents make iden-
tical decisions but they still differ in their labor quality, labor income, and
consumption because of the different realizations of the two shocks. In the
life-cycle model that I consider, therefore, there are both types of hetero-
geneity, within generation and across generation. Across generation het-
erogeneity is inherent in the life-cycle models.
I study calibrated versions of the model to assess the quantitative im-
portance of incomplete markets. Risk related parameters—the variances of
the two shock processes in the human capital accumulation technology—
are chosen to match the portion of the variance in labor earnings over the
life-cycle that is due to age effects. I study a baseline case which has a mix-
ture of the two types of shocks, and also a more extreme case where there
is only career risk. Such an analysis allows us to clearly see how each of
these risks, the specialization and the career risk, influence the aggregate
economy by altering an individual’s decisions. In addition to studying the
macroeconomic implications of market incompleteness due to risky human
capital, in this paper I also explore the life-cycle features implied by the
model.
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1.3 Main findings
I first establish that the stationary equilibrium of this model with only ca-
reer risk has properties similar to Aiyagari (1994). Aiyagari studied the
macroeconomic impact of uninsurable idiosyncratic labor income risk aris-
ing due to shocks to labor endowments in a model where households live
forever and where there is no human capital. The career-risk-only case of
the present model has implications similar to Aiyagari (1994).5 In particu-
lar, the precautionary savings induced by this risk has only a small quanti-
tative impact on the macroeconomy.
I then study the baseline calibration where both shocks play a role. In
the baseline calibration, almost all the variance in labor income early in life
when agents are investing in training is due to specialization risk. Later in
life, both risks play a role. I find that the effects of the specialization risk
dominate and there is a very large impact on macroeconomic variables in
the stationary equilibrium. In particular, there is a 43 percent underaccu-
mulation of human capital relative to the complete markets case. Accord-
ingly, since labor quality is dramatically lower, output, physical capital,
consumption and other variables are also drastically affected by the idio-
syncratic uninsurable uncertainty.
I conclude that uninsurable idiosyncratic specialization risk has a large
impact on macroeconomic equilibrium, but that uninsurable idiosyncratic
career risk does not.
Does human capital risk have a significant impact on actual economies?
It may if the shocks resemble the baseline calibration. But if most of the
risk in human capital investment is due to career risk, then the influence
could diminish markedly.6 In a way, the quantitative analysis nests both
the views that are commonly seen in the literature, one following the tra-
dition of Aiyagari (1994) that argues that the quantitative effects of incom-
5This is despite the fact that there are no borrowing constraints or wealth effects in the
present model with human capital accumulation.
6This is in contrast to Krebs (2003) where market incompleteness due to uninsurable
idiosyncratic human capital risk generates large quantitative effects for the macroeconomy.
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plete markets are small, and a relatively recent view associated with An-
geletos and Calvet (2006), Pijoan-Mas (2006) and Marcet, Obiols-Homs and
Weil (2007), that suggests that these effects could be large.7 One conclusion
is that empirical studies based on micro data would need to identify the
relative importance of these shocks in order to assess the implications of
market incompleteness on the aggregate economy.
Apart from aiding our analysis in thinking about human capital invest-
ment and matching some of the salient features of the aggregate economy,
the life-cycle model stays consistent with some of the features of the life-
cycle that are often studied in partial equilibrium settings, for example the
shape of mean earnings and the variance of labor earnings over the life-
cycle.
1.4 Recent related literature
Using an incompletemarkets framework, several papers since Bewley (1977)
have investigated the core implications of uninsurable idiosyncratic labor
income risk on the aggregate economy. These papers typically abstract
from aggregate uncertainty.8 In Aiyagari (1994) individuals face uninsur-
able labor endowment risk which makes their labor income variable and
uncertain. In addition, households face borrowing constraints in the credit
market. In such a setup, households self-insure by increasing their pre-
cautionary savings when income risk rises. Due to market incompleteness
and imperfect credit markets, the stationary equilibrium is characterized
by higher capital stock, lower interest rates and higher output. However,
the quantitative implications of the labor income risk are not very strik-
7Neither of these authors talked explicitly about human capital. Aiyagari (1994), Pijoan-
Mas (2006) and Marcet, Obiols-Homs and Weil (2007) studied labor income risk whereas
Angeletos and Calvet (2006) analyzed capital income risk. This paper is closer to Aiyagari
(1994) and Marcet, Obiols-Homs and Weil (2007) but provides a different mechanism to
explain the variance in labor income. It also nests both the views in the literature and argues
that the nature of risk, specialization versus career risk, determines which view prevails in
the quantitative analysis.
8Krusell and Smith (1998) among others incorporate both idiosyncratic and aggregate
risk.
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ing in Aiyagari (1994). In contrast recent papers by Marcet, Obiols-Homs
and Weil (2007) and Pijoan-Mas (2006) find that market incompleteness
could potentially have a large quantitative impact on the macroeconomy.
In a model similar to Huggett (1997), another standard incomplete mar-
kets model with labor endowment shocks, Marcet, Obiols-Homs and Weil
(2007) endogenize labor supply decisions. Their findings suggest that pri-
marily due to wealth effects, market incompleteness can have a consider-
ably large impact on the aggregate economy when labor elasticity is larger
than consumption elasticity and leisure is a normal good.9
Another recent paper, Angeletos and Calvet (2006) that focuses on cap-
ital income uncertainty arising due to idiosyncratic uninsurable entrepre-
neurial risk, production as well as endowment risk, also finds large quan-
titative effects of market incompleteness. They argue that, in general, en-
trepreneurial risk reduces the demand for investment. At the same time,
however, increase in uninsurable capital income risk raises precautionary
savings which lowers the interest rate and therefore raises investment de-
mand. As long as interest elasticity of savings is low, capital will be under-
accumulated relative to the complete markets benchmark.
While Angeletos and Calvet (2006) study the aggregate implications of
market incompleteness in a model with risky entrepreneurial income, a re-
lated paper, Krebs (2003), studies the impact of labor income risk in amodel
with risky human capital and risk-free physical capital. In Krebs (2003) this
risky human capital is also the engine of growth. The decision to invest in
human capital is modelled as a portfolio decision where an agent decides
what fraction of savings to invest in risky human capital and how much to
invest in the risk-free physical capital. He finds that risk lowers investment
in human capital which in turn lowers growth and welfare.10
Based on Krebs (2003) it is not clear whether the quantitatively signifi-
9In the stationary equilibrium of some calibrated economies, for example, aggregate out-
put is 50 percent lower relative to its complete markets benchmark. See Table 1 in Marcet,
Obiols-Homs and Weil (2007).
10In the baseline calibration of Krebs (2003) complete elimination of labor income risk,
which is entirely due to human capital risk, increases growth by 0.13 percent.
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cant macroeconomic implications of risky human capital are due to market
incompleteness or because human capital is the engine of growth. To iso-
late the role of uninsurable risky human capital, I abstract from growth in
the steady state. Even though in this paper I ask a question similar to Krebs
(2003), the framework used here is quite different and is more consistent
with the traditional analyses of human capital investment. I consider a
general equilibrium life-cycle model with a Ben-Porath production process
for risky human capital investments.
A feature of this paper is that it can also produce some of the life-cycle
features seen in the data in a general equilibrium framework. There is
growing empirical-theoretic, primarily partial equilibrium literature study-
ing the life-cycle features in the data, for example the rise in the variance
of earnings and consumption and the hump-shaped mean earnings and
consumption over the life-cycle. Deaton and Paxson (1994), Huggett, Ven-
tura and Yaron (2007), Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004), Heathcote,
Storesletten and Violante (2005) among others study these issues. Deaton
and Paxson (1994) use a complete markets framework to study the life-
cycle features of their model and compare them to the U.S. cohort data.11
They find that the age-profile of the dispersion of earnings and consump-
tion increases over the life-cycle in the data and that non-separable pref-
erences over consumption and leisure along with skill heterogeneity can
explain these features. Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004) argue that
Deaton and Paxson’s analysis has inconsistent implications for hours. As a
result these authors attempt to explain the same features of the data using
an incomplete markets framework where agents face idiosyncratic, unin-
surable earnings risk, similar to Aiyagari (1994) and others but in a life-
cycle context. In a related paper, Huggett, Ventura and Yaron (2007) use a
partial equilibrium model with risky human capital to explain these same
features in the data.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model while
11Deaton and Paxson (1994) also studied data from Great Britain and Taiwan which had
features similar to the U.S..
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section 3 discusses some intuition using a two-period overlapping genera-
tion model. In the final section I present quantitative results.
2 Model
The economy has an infinite sequence of overlapping generations of agents
who live for T periods. Time is discrete and is indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, ... In
each period, a continuum of ex ante identical young agents with unit mass
is born. Each agent is endowed with two units of time in each period until
they retire. There is no population growth. Physical capital is risk-free and
there are no credit market imperfections.12 In terms of notation, subscripts
indicate when the agent is born and the stage in an agent’s life-cycle or the
time in the model is in the parenthesis. In general, the aggregate variables
do not have a subscript.
2.1 Incomplete markets
Each agent consumes a final good in every period such that the preferences
of agent i born at date t are given by
U = E
T 1
∑
j=0
βju(cit(t+ j)) (1)
where cit(t+ j) is the consumption of the final good of agent i who is born
at date t at stage t+ j in the life-cycle, the discount factor is β, and E is the
expectation operator. For tractability I assume that the utility function has
the CARA form such that u(c) =   1a exp[ ac] where a is the coefficient of
absolute risk aversion.
The budget constraint of the agent for 0  j < JR, where JR is the
exogenous date at which agents retire, is given by
cit(t+ j) = w(t+ j)f(1  τit(t+ j))x¯ + x
i
t(t+ j)g
+ R(t+ j  1)sit(t+ j  1)  sit(t+ j) (2)
12Recent literature on incomplete markets, Magill and Quinzii (1996), Krebs (2003), An-
geletos and Calvet (2006) among others, abstracts from credit market imperfections.
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and
cit(t+ j) = R(t+ j  1)sit(t+ j  1)  sit(t+ j) (3)
for JR  j  T   1. Time allocated to training by agent i is 0  τit(t+ j) 
1, sit(t + j) is the holdings of risk-free asset (capital) and x
i
t(t + j) is the
labor quality, measured in efficiency units, at date t+ j. The wage rate per
efficiency unit in period t+ j is w(t+ j) and R(t+ j) is the gross return on
the risk-free asset holdings from period t+ j to t+ j+ 1. Since there are no
bequests, agents enter the first period without any assets and do not save
in the last period of their life. Agents born at any date t however inherit the
average aggregate labor quality x(t) prevalent at that date and as a result
xt(t) = x(t).
To ensure that all agents in the same stage of their life-cycle, agents
within a generation, make the same training and asset holding decisions
that are independent of the actual realization of the two shocks we assume
that the labor quality of an agent xit(t + j), measured in efficiency units,
enters additively such that it does not interact with the training decision
in period t+ j. The parameter x
¯
> 0 converts units of time into efficiency
units.13 If τit(t+ j) = 1, agents receive w(t+ j)x
i
t(t+ j) in labor income and
when agents stop training, τit(t + j) = 0, they allocate both units of their
time to the labor market and their labor income becomes w(t+ j)fx
¯
+xit(t+
j)g. Capital income is the only source of income after retirement.
In this paper, I use a modified Ben-Porath’s (1967) production function
for human capital with time allocated to training as the input in the pro-
duction technology.14 Human capital investments require agents to give
up labor income early in the life-cycle in order to generate higher future
efficiency units. When allocating τit(t+ j) units of time to training at date
t + j, an agent is however uncertain about the number of efficiency units
13One aspect of this specification is that in a stationary equilibrium, the marginal cost of
acquiring training is the same across all agents and is independent of their own individual
labor quality.
14A one-input training technology is used here. In a richer multi-input specification,
returns to training could depend on an agent’s ability, the level of human and physical
capital in the previous periods.
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received in the subsequent period. Therefore, at the time when the training
decision is made, the returns from training are uncertain making these in-
vestments risky. We assume the following functional form for the training
technology
hit(t+ j+ 1) = γ(t+ j)τ
i
t(t+ j)
φeit (t+ j+ 1) + η
i
t (t+ j+ 1) (4)
for 0  j < JR   1. Here 0 < φ < 1 is the return elasticity of training
and γ(t+ j) is the productivity of an agent who invested τit(t+ j) time in
training. The productivity is the same for all the agents in the same stage of
the life-cycle but could vary over different stages of an agents’s life-cycle.
The two idiosyncratic shocks, the specialization shock eit (t+ j+ 1) , and
the career shock ηit (t+ j+ 1) , are normally distributed, independent and
identical across agents within a generation and independent across gen-
erations. The risk associated with the returns from training could vary
across generations implying that eit(t+ j)  N(1, σe(t+ j)) and ηit(t+ j) 
N(0, ση(t+ j)). The expected return from training in period t+ j+ 1 is
Ehit(t+ j+ 1) = γ(t+ j)τ
i
t(t+ j)
φ
and the variance is
Vhit(t+ j+ 1) =

γ(t+ j)τit(t+ j)
φ
2
σ2e(t+ j+ 1) + σ
2
η(t+ j+ 1).
In the case of complete markets, eit(t+ j) = 0 and η
i
t(t+ j) = 0 for all the
individuals and at all dates.
The specialization risk eit(t+ j+ 1) is such that for the same level of risk,
if individuals devote more time to training, they face a positive risk-return
trade-off.15 Allocating more time to training increases the expected future
returns but at the same time it also increases the variance of the returns
15Numerous studies have estimated the returns to schooling. See Griliches (1977) and
Card (2001) for a survey of this literature. In estimating the returns from education, this lit-
erature however has ignored the riskiness of these investments. For our analysis, the study
by Palacios-Huerta (2003) is the most relevant. Using wage data from the March Current
Population Survey (CPS) for 1964-1996, he reports the descriptive statistics of human capi-
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from training. For instance, a college graduate who invests more years in
training faces a higher return from training but also faces a greater risk rel-
ative to a high school graduate who devotes fewer years in training and
hence faces lower risk-return trade-off. In Palacios-Huerta (2003), average
real human capital return for white males with less than 5 years of experi-
ence with no high school, high school and college education are: 5.9 (6.2),
13.6 (9.7), 14.2 (11.3) respectively, with standard deviation of returns re-
ported in the parenthesis. The career risk ηit(t + j + 1) can be interpreted
as the general uncertainty associated with working in a job, whether the
match is good, whether the agent is compatible with other workers, and
other aspects of the labor market that are not incorporated in the model
but are independent of the level of training. If there is only career risk,
σe(t) = 0, then for the same level of risk, acquiring more training only
increases the mean return from training but leaves the variance unaltered.
The uncertainty in the returns from training makes an agent’s human
capital, represented by the labor quality, random.16 Random labor quality
makes labor income uncertain in this paper. The labor quality of an agent
i at date t+ j depends on the undepreciated level of inherited average ag-
gregate labor quality and the human capital accumulated in the previous
periods via training, the first and second terms respectively in the follow-
tal returns in Table 1 which suggests that there is evidence of a positive risk-return tradeoff
in human capital investment for white males in the US. Other studies, for example a cross
country study by Pereira and Martins (2002), and a study by Christainsen, Joensen and
Nielsen (2006) using Danish data, also show that a positive risk-return trade-off exists in
human capital investment.
16Uncertain labor quality is the source of labor income uncertainty in this paper. We
abstract from labor income uncertainty arising because of labor market frictions. See, for
example, Gomes, Greenwood and Rebelo (2001), Costain and Reiter (2005), Hall (2006),
Rudanko (2007) among others.
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ing equation
xit(t+ j) = (1  δh)jx(t) +
j 1
∑
m=0
hit(t+m+ 1)
= (1  δh)jx(t)+
j 1
∑
m=0
fγ(t+m)τit(t+m)φeit (t+m+ 1)+ ηit (t+m+ 1)g
(5)
where the average aggregate labor quality inherited when young, x(t), de-
preciates at rate δh. We also require that only inherited labor quality depre-
ciates in order to abstract from wealth effects.
The labor quality of an agent has the following mean and variance
Exit(t+ j) = (1  δh)jx(t) +
j 1
∑
m=0
γ(t+m)τit(t+m)
φ (6)
Vxit(t+ j) =
j 1
∑
m=0
[fγ(t+m)τit(t+m)φg2σ2e(t+m+ 1)+ σ2η(t+m+ 1)]. (7)
The production technology of the final good is standard. There are two
inputs, capital and labor and the production process exhibits constant re-
turns to scale with the following specification
Y(t) = AK(t)αL(t)1 α, (8)
where K(t) is the aggregate capital stock and L(t) is total labor supply mea-
sured in efficiency units at date t. The intensive form representation of the
training technology is standard, y(t) = Ak(t)α, where y(t) is the output per
efficiency unit and k(t) is the capital per efficiency unit. Total labor supply
at date t, measured in efficiency units, is given by17
L(t) =
JR 1
∑
j=0
f(1  τt j(t))x¯ + xt j(t)g. (9)
17I suppress superscript i since all the agents within a generation are identical with re-
spect to their endogenous decisions.
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Inputs are hired in competitive markets and are therefore paid their mar-
ginal products. Hence the wage rate per efficiency unit is w(t) = (1  
α)Ak(t)α and the rental rate of capital is r(t) = αAk(t)α 1. Let δk be the
rate at which capital depreciates, then R(t) = r(t+ 1) + 1  δk.
At the aggregate level there is no uncertainty. We can write the aggre-
gate market clearing condition for physical capital as
L(t)k(t) =
T 1
∑
j=1
st j(t  1). (10)
The law of motion of average aggregate labor quality is described by the
following equation
x(t) =
E∑JR 1j=0 xt j(t)
JR
. (11)
At date t, the average labor quality of any generation born in period t  j is
Ext j(t), for j = 0, 1, ...JR   1. Averaging over all the generations gives the
average aggregate labor quality at date t which is inherited by the agents
born at date t.
3 Some intuition
In this section I briefly describe some intuition coming from the simplest
two-period case before considering the extended model described in the
previous section. Let T = 2 so that the model collapses to a two-period
overlapping generations model. For simplicity there is no retirement and
since agents live for two periods, they hold assets and train only in the first
period. We consider this case to illustrate the qualitative implications of
our model. Agent specific superscript is dropped for clarity. CARA-normal
specification allows us to get closed form solution for an individual’s deci-
sions. With closed form solutions we can clearly see the impact of risk on
these decisions.
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3.1 Individual decisions
For T = 2, equation (1) simplifies and the utility function of an agent born
at date t is given by the following equation
U =  1
a
exp[ act(t)]  βE1a exp[ act(t+ 1)]. (12)
The budget constraint in the first and second period of the life-cycle are
ct(t) = w(t)f(1  τt(t))x¯+xt(t)g  st(t) and ct(t+ 1) = w(t+ 1)fx¯+xt(t+
1)g+ R(t)st(t) respectively. Labor quality when old is given by
xt(t+ 1) = (1  δh)x(t) + γ(t)τt(t)φet(t+ 1) + ηt (t+ 1) . (13)
Since we use CARA preferences and assume that the shocks are normally
distributed, we can rewrite the agent’s problem as
U =  1
a
exp[ act(t)]  β1a exp[ afEct(t+ 1) 
a
2
Vct(t+ 1)g], (14)
where the expected value of date t+ 1 consumption is
Ect(t+ 1) = w(t+ 1)fx¯ + (1  δh)x(t) + γ(t)τt(t)
φg+ R(t)st(t) (15)
and the variance is
Vct(t+ 1) = w(t+ 1)2f(γ(t)τt(t)φ)2σ2e + σ2ηg. (16)
Given initial inheritance of labor quality x(t), wage ratesw(t), andw(t+
1) and interest rate R(t), maximizing the agent’s utility with respect to ct(t),
ct(t+ 1), and τt(t) gives the following first order conditions
Ect(t+ 1)  ct(t) = 1a ln(βR(t)) +
a
2
Vct(t+ 1) (17)
w(t)x
¯
=
φw(t+ 1)γ(t)τt(t)φ 1
R(t)
 
a
22φw(t+ 1)
2γ(t)2τt(t)2φ 1σ2e
R(t)
. (18)
These two equations collapse to the complete markets benchmark when
σe = 0 and ση = 0. Relative to the complete markets case, the Euler equa-
tion (17) that determines the optimal level of asset holding has an extra term
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on the right hand side, a2Vct(t+ 1), the precautionary savings. Similarly, an
extra term appears on the right hand side of equation (18) because markets
are incomplete. Whenmarkets are complete, at the optimal level of training
the marginal cost of acquiring training, the left hand side of equation (18)
equals the present value of the future marginal benefit, the first term on the
right hand side of this equation. When markets are incomplete, however,
agents have to be compensated for the risk they face when they invest in
training. Therefore, the second term on the right hand side is the risk pre-
mium on human capital investment. It is increasing in specialization risk
σ2e. Interestingly, from the two equations we see that while optimal asset
holding is affected by both types of risk, the training decision, even when
markets are incomplete, is not directly affected by the career risk. This
suggests that individual decisions could differ depending on whether the
agents face specialization risk, career risk or both, similar to the findings of
Angeletos and Calvet (2006).
To explore this further, let the return elasticity of training φ equal 1/2.18
This allows us to get explicit solutions for the optimal level of asset holding
and training of a young agent. Using these solutions we clearly see the role
of risk and how it enters an individual’s decisions in this simple two-period
model with incomplete markets.
st(t) =
1
1+ R(t)

1
a
ln(βR(t)) + w(t)f(1  τt(t))x¯ + x(t)g
  w(t+ 1)fx
¯
+ (1  δh)x(t) + γ(t)τt(t)0.5g+ a2Vtct(t+ 1)g (19)
τt(t) =

w(t+ 1)γ(t)
2R(t)w(t)x
¯
+ aw(t+ 1)2γ(t)2σ2e
2
. (20)
Consider the case where σe = 0, and ση > 0. Based on the comparative
static results for this case where changes in the time allocated to training
18In the human capital literature the estimated elasticity lies in the range (0.5, 0.9). See
Browning, Hansen and Heckman (1999) Table 2.3 and 2.4 for further details. Section 4.2.4.
investigates the robustness of our results by varying φ.
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only influence the mean return from training but not the variance, we see
that the training decision is in fact unaffected by the career risk. Asset hold-
ing is however increasing in this risk because of the precautionary motive.
Now let σe > 0, and ση = 0. In this case, since altering the decision to train
impacts the variance of the return from training, agents train less when risk
increases. As before, the direct effect of risk on real asset holding is positive
for precautionary reasons. However, in this case risk also impacts real asset
holding indirectly via training decisions. If the following inequality holds,
then the saving decision is increasing in risk.
 1  0.5w(t+ 1)γ(t)τt(t)
 0.5
w(t)x
¯
 
a
2w(t+ 1)
2γ(t)2σ2e
w(t)x
¯
(21)
From equation (18) we know that the right hand side of the above inequal-
ity equals the gross interest rate on the risk-free asset which is greater than
1 implying that this inequality holds.
4 Quantitative analysis
In the previous section we argued that the qualitative effect of risk, the
specialization risk versus the career risk, on an agent’s decision to hold
risk-free assets and train could potentially be very different. This section
explores the general equilibrium consequences of market incompleteness
on decisions and the aggregate economy in various calibrated stationary
equilibria of our model. It also investigates whether these qualitative re-
sults are in fact quantitatively significant.
Our calibration strategy, similar to Aiyagari (1994), is to first choose pa-
rameters such that they match some targets in the US data for the complete
markets benchmark. To calibrate risk, we use the life-cycle features of our
model. We consider three calibrated versions of our model that primarily
differ along one dimension, the calibration of risk, which is chosen to en-
dogenously generate variance of logarithm of labor income that matches
data.19 The three cases are the Aiyagari-like economy, the career risk only
19The only exception is the Aiyagari-like economy that differs in the calibration of other
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economy, and the baseline calibration economy. In spite of the fact that all
of these economies endogenously generate variance in labor income that
matches the relevant data, the aggregate implications are strikingly differ-
ent across these economies.
4.1 Calibration of complete market benchmark
In our calibration, the model period is eight years and an agent lives for 8
periods, or 64 years, from age 16 to 80. In the last two periods, at the age of
64, agents stop participating in the labor market and retire. An agent trains
for 6 years between the ages 16  32, the first two periods in this eight pe-
riod model. We use standard values of α, β and δk. To match the share of
physical capital in income we use α = 0.4. The annual discount factor β is
0.975 and the annual depreciation rate of physical capital is 8 percent. We
choose the depreciation rate of human capital as 4 percent such that initially
when agents are accumulating human capital labor quality increases and
after that it decreases gradually till they exit the labor market.20 The other
five parameters A, a, x
¯
, γ(t) and γ(t+ 1) are chosen to match the following
targets in the U.S. data. Our first goal is to make sure that the economy has
a reasonable level of physical capital. We target capital-output ratio at 4.14
and consumption-output ratio at 0.748. The target for the gross annual in-
terest rate on the risk free asset is 1.03 percent. Our second goal is to ensure
that in equilibrium there is an appropriate level of education that matches
the U.S. data. According to the Current Population Survey (CPS) on school
enrollment,21 95.7 percent of the Americans between the age 15  17, 72.5
percent from the age 18  19, 39.4 percent from 20  24 and 12.1 percent
between the age 25  34 are enrolled in school in 2006. The enrollment rate
data allows us to calibrate time devoted to training within each period. In
the first period, between the age 16  24, we target 5.5 years of training and
parameters as well since we want to abstract from human capital accumulation in order to
match key features of Aiyagari’s (1994) model.
20In the robustness section, section 4.2.4., we vary δh.
21See Table S1401.
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TABLE 1. CALIBRATION OF RISK
Specialization risk Career risk
fσe(t+ j)gj=5j=1 fση(t+ j)gj=5j=1
Aiyagari-like f0gj=5j=1 f0.08, 0.03, 0.04, 0.04, 0.04g
Career risk only f0gj=5j=1 f0.08, 0.03, 0.03, 0.06, 0.03g
Baseline calibration f1.41, 1.84, 0, 0, 0g f0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.02, 0.02g
Table 1: Calibrated values of the standard deviation of the two shock
processes in different economies with incomplete markets.
about half year in the second period, age 24  32.22 As a consequence, in our
model an individual must spend 6 years, two years in secondary and four
years in post-secondary education, in school between the age 16  32. To-
tal number of years spent in school by an average American over this time
period is consistent with our targets. The average school life expectancy in
the U.S. is approximately 16 years, 6 years in primary education, starting at
the age of 6, a little less than 6 years in secondary education starting at age
12 and 4 years in post-secondary and tertiary education.23 The relative risk
aversion implied by our model lies in the range (1, 3). Given that we have
more targets relative to free parameters, our calibration is not precise but it
is very close to the targets.
4.1.1 Two types of risks
In the second step of our calibration, we use the life-cycle features of our
model to match the variance of labor earnings over the life-cycle which is
primarily due to age effects to the U.S. data.24 In our model since there is no
22A calculation based on CPS would suggest that agents train for approximately 5 years
between the age 16-24 and 1 year between the age 24-32.
23These statistics are based on the estimates of the United Nation Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) Global Education Digest 2004, see Figure 1.
24We follow Aiyagari (1994) in calibrating our model. Our targets for physical and hu-
man capital suggest that the data are generated under complete markets. However, when
we calibrate risk, we assume that the data are generated under incomplete markets. One
advantage of this procedure is that the complete markets case is identical across all the
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growth and at age 16 all agents are ex ante identical, variance in labor earn-
ings over the life-cycle is entirely due to age effects. But in the data there
may be numerous other reasons why dispersion in labor earnings increases
over the life-cycle, for example, time effects, cohort effects, differences in
initial conditions, human capital risk, and other employment related risks.
For our analysis, the Huggett, Ventura and Yaron (2007) paper provides a
close approximation of the age effects in the variance of labor earnings.25
In addition, in our model there are no other sources of within generation
heterogeneity except for the heterogeneity due to the idiosyncratic human
capital shocks. Therefore the variance of labor earnings over the life-cycle
which is due to age effects must be entirely due to these shocks. Huggett,
Ventura and Yaron (2007) investigate different sources of labor income dis-
persion and conclude that approximately 1/3 of the variance in lifetime
earnings due to age effects is actually explained by idiosyncratic human
capital risks.26 As a result, we choose the variance of the two idiosyncratic
human capital shock processes over the life-cycle such that the life-cycle
pattern of labor earning variability generated by our model under market
incompleteness is in fact 1/3 of the variance in labor earnings in the data.27
In our quantitative analysis, we consider three calibrated economies,
the Aiyagari-like economy, the career risk only economy, and the baseline cal-
economies with endogenous training. Ideally, calibrated economies with market incom-
pleteness must match the U.S. data. However, as will be apparent from Tables 2 and 3,
the calibration strategy used here does not matter for two out of the three economies that
we consider in this paper since market incompleteness has a very small and quantitatively
insignificant impact.
25They use earnings data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 1969-2004
family files. They assume that the earnings data is generated by three factors, cohort, time,
and age effects. Cohort effects are the effects that impact all the agents born in a particular
year, time effects impact all the generations alive at a particular date. Due to the linear
relationship between time and age, the age effects cannot be isolated easily. As a result they
isolate the age effects by either controlling for time or controlling for cohort. In our analysis,
we use the regression results where they control for time. See Figure 2a in Huggett, Ventura
and Yaron (2007).
26Identification of idiosyncratic human capital shocks in Huggett, Ventura and Yaron
(2007) relies on the fact that closer to retirement agents do not invest in human capital.
During this period when there is no investment in human capital, changes in the wage
rate, product of the rental rate and human capital, are entirely due to changes in the rental
rate and/or the human capital shocks. Using this identification strategy, they estimate the
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Figure 1: A comparison of the variance of logarithm of labor income in different
calibrated cases of the incomplete markets version of our model with the relevant
data from Huggett, Ventura and Yaron (2007).
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ibration economy. Table 1 reports the underlying standard deviation of the
sequence of shocks, fσe(t+ j)gj=5j=1 and fση(t+ j)gj=5j=1, that are used in the
calibration of the incomplete markets version of these economies. As noted
earlier, the standard deviation of the two shocks varies across generations
but remains constant for agents within a generation at all times. Notice that
in this model there is no risk in the first period of life as agents have not yet
invested in training and in the last two periods after they retire. Figure 1
illustrates how this calibration strategy allows us to match the earnings dis-
persion generated by our model with Huggett, Ventura and Yaron’s (2007)
measure of the variance of labor earnings which is due to idiosyncratic hu-
man capital shocks. All the economies, except the specialization risk only
economy, can be calibrated to match the data. Specialization risk interacts
with the time allocated to education, and agents invest in training only in
the first two periods of their life-cycle. Therefore in the specialization risk
only economy, the sequence of shocks cannot be calibrated to match the
increase in the variance of labor earnings over the life-cycle.28
4.2 Results
Following the calibration procedure described above, we study stationary
equilibria of calibrated economies to determine the quantitative macroeco-
nomic consequences of market incompleteness in a general equilibrium
life-cycle model.
standard deviation of the human capital shocks.
27In our model, human capital investment refers to time the spent in education and hence
agents train for 6 years after the age of 16. Human capital risk is both multiplicative and
additive in our framework. In Huggett, Ventura and Yaron (2007) human capital shocks
enter multiplicatively in the law of motion of human capital. For these shocks to play a role
over most of the life-cycle, they assume that agents invest time in training until they are
close to the retirement age. The time allocation problem, the trade-off between training and
working exists for most part of the life-cycle, an unrealistic implication of their model. As
a result, we consider that the risk identified in Huggett, Ventura and Yaron (2007) is in fact
a proxy for both the risks that the agents face over their life-cycle, specialization and career
risk.
28The specification of risk in the specilization risk only economy is the following fσe(t+
j)gj=5j=1 = f1.732g
j=5
j=1 and fση(t+ j)g
j=5
j=1 = f0g
j=5
j=1.
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4.2.1 Aiyagari-like economy
We construct a version of Aiyagari (1994) in a life-cycle context, Aiyagari-
like economy. Such a construction ensures that the predictions based on
an appropriately calibrated model, the Aiyagari-like economy, are consis-
tent with the quantitative findings of the existing literature that studies the
effect of uninsurable idiosyncratic labor income risk on the aggregate econ-
omy. In addition this construction rules out the likelihood that some of
the features of our model–life-cycle model with CARA preferences with no
wealth effects and no borrowing constraints–are shaping the main findings
of the paper.
Aiyagari (1994) studied uninsurable labor endowment risk in a model
with no human capital where agents live forever. This is a life-cycle model,
and unlike Aiyagari there are no borrowing constraints and no wealth ef-
fects. To collapse ourmodel with human capital accumulation to anAiyagari-
like economy, we set γ(t) and γ(t + 1) equal to zero such that agents do
not invest in training. Due to lack of education, specialization risk does
not play any role in this calibration. We endow the agents with an average
steady state labor quality xˆ from our complete markets benchmark, column
1, panel B, Table 2. We set δh = 0. The rest of the parameters are calibrated
to meet the targets mentioned in the previous section.
Panel A of Table 2 reports the aggregate macroeconomic variables in the
stationary equilibrium of the Aiyagari-like economy. Both qualitative and
quantitative results in the Aiyagari-like economy are similar to Aiyagari
(1994). Whenmarkets are incomplete, the savings rate (which equals δkk/y)
increases relative to the complete markets benchmark but the increase is
not quantitatively significant. In Aiyagari (1994), the increase in the sav-
ings rate is in the range f0.06, 7.33g, expressed in percentage points.29 In
29In the quantitative analysis of Aiyagari (1994) logarithm of labor endowment shock
follows an AR(1) process with different values of the autoregressive coefficient and the
coefficient of variation based on various studies. He reports his results based on different
combinations of relative risk aversion, coefficient of variation and serial correlation. See
Table II in Aiyagari (1994). In reporting the range here, we do not consider the case where
the net return on capital is negative, the last entry in Table II.
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TABLE 2. ECONOMIES WITH CAREER RISK ALONE
Aiyagari-like economy Career risk only economy
Panel A Panel B
C.M. I.M. C.M. I.M.
xˆ 0.154 0.154 0.1540 0.1542
kˆ 1.344 1.354 1.275 1.276
Kˆ/Yˆ 4.15 4.17 4.02 4.03
Cˆ/Yˆ 0.747 0.746 0.755 0.755
Lˆ/Yˆ 0.386 0.385 0.395 0.394
Rˆ 1.032 1.031 1.034 1.034
wˆ 1.553 1.558 1.521 1.521
Yˆ 4.644 4.658 4.272 4.276
Table 2: Comparing the quantitative macroeconomic effects of incomplete
markets (IM) with the complete markets (CM) in the stationary equilibria
of the economies with career risk alone – the Aiyagari-like economy and
the career risk only economy.
the Aiyagari-like economy, the increase in savings rate is 0.11 percentage
points. Higher savings rate raises output in both cases relative to their re-
spective complete markets benchmark. Another consequence of increased
savings is that the annual net interest rate (expressed in percentage points)
declines by f0.02, 2.88g in Aiyagari (1994) and 0.035 in the Aiyagari-like
economy.30 The Aiyagari-like economy, where there is no human capital
accumulation, therefore corresponds to the less extreme cases in Aiyagari
(1994).
4.2.2 Career risk only economy
Can market incompleteness in a model where investment in human capital
is risky also produce small and quantitatively insignificant results? Con-
sider the career risk only economy that differs from the Aiyagari-like econ-
30This is computed based on the annual interest rate reported in Table 2. For convenience,
all the tables report the annual interest rate instead of the period interest rate.
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omy along two dimensions, agents endogenously decide how much to
train and human capital depreciates to maintain a constant level of labor
quality in the stationary equilibrium.
Table 2, panel B presents results for the career risk only economy. Rel-
ative to the complete markets benchmark, incomplete markets have small
and quantitatively insignificant effects on the aggregate economy, even smaller
than the Aiyagari-like economy. Like the Aiyagari-like economy, the sav-
ings rate increases and output is also higher when markets are incomplete.
A striking result in the career risk only economy is that when markets are
incomplete there is overaccumulation of human capital, though quantita-
tively insignificant but in compliance with Angeletos and Calvet (2006).31
These results demonstrate that allowing agents to optimally decide how
much time to allocate to training when returns from training are uncertain
and uninsurable is not enough to generate large quantitative effects. More-
over, when individuals face career risk, the risk where a change in training
only affects the mean return but not the variance of the return from train-
ing, the effect of market incompleteness are marginal.
Our next specification of the incomplete markets incorporates special-
ization risk as well.
4.2.3 Baseline calibration economy
In the incomplete markets case of the baseline calibration economy, we as-
sume that agents face both risks. Since the empirical literature provides
no guidance on how to assign weights to these shocks, we assign these
weights in a way that attributes almost all the variability in labor earnings
to specialization risk early in the life-cycle and later, the additional risk that
agents face is entirely due to the career shocks. The reason behind such an
extreme calibration is that in this economy we want to explore the role of
specialization risk while still matching the data on life-cycle labor income
variability. From Figure 1 it is clear that specialization risk alone cannot
31Labor quality-output ratio also increases, albeit very marginally.
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TABLE 3. BASELINE CALIBRATION
Complete markets Incomplete markets
xˆ 0.154 0.088
kˆ 1.275 1.381
Kˆ/Yˆ 4.02 4.22
Cˆ/Yˆ 0.755 0.742
Lˆ/Yˆ 0.395 0.382
Rˆ 1.034 1.030
wˆ 1.521 1.575
Yˆ 4.272 3.366
Table 3: Aggregate effects of market incompleteness in the stationary equi-
librium of the baseline calibration economy.
match the data and hence we combine it with career risk.
As mentioned before, the two economies with endogenous training de-
cision, the career risk only economy and the baseline calibration economy,
differ only in the way the risks are calibrated. As a result, the complete
markets case is identical for the two economies, column 1 in panel B of Ta-
ble 2 and column 2 in Table 3. However, note that the stationary equilibria
with uninsurable idiosyncratic human capital risk are strikingly different.
The stationary equilibrium of the baseline calibration economy clearly il-
lustrates that the specialization risk plays a very crucial role in determining
the aggregate implications of market incompleteness. Market incomplete-
ness has a significant impact on human capital accumulation causing the
average labor quality to decline by 43 percent. This is in stark contrast with
the findings of Aiyagari (1994) where the quantitative effect of incomplete
markets was marginal. Agents self-insure in this economy by allocating
less time to training. Due to such a sharp decrease in average labor qual-
ity, capital and the labor supply reduce dramatically by 12 and 19 percent
respectively. Unlike the other economies studied here, output falls and the
decrease is substantial–17 percent relative to the complete markets bench-
mark. Like Aiyagari (1994) and other studies in this literature, agents in
this economy also insure themselves against the uninsurable risk by hold-
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ing more risk-free assets. As a result, capital-output ratio increases by 4.9
percent, even though in the aggregate both capital and output fall relative
to the complete markets case. The annual net interest rate decreases by 0.37
percentage points.
In the baseline calibration economy, the underaccumulation of human
capital is large relative to the findings of Krebs (2003). In Krebs (2003) in-
vestment in human capital is 4.2 percentage points (of GDP) lower relative
to the complete markets case. The comparable number for this economy
is 19.8 percentage points.32 Therefore, not accounting for the time alloca-
tion problem in an economy where specialization risk is the main source
of uninsurable human capital risk can lead to a substantial misstatement
of the impact of risk on human capital investment. Investment in physical
capital in Krebs (2003) is 3.95 percentage points (of GDP) higher relative to
complete markets benchmark. In our baseline calibration economy, invest-
ment in physical capital relative to output, the savings rate, increases by
1.20 percentage points, an increase which is 1/3 of the increase in Krebs.
Therefore it appears that in this economy agents self insure but more by
altering their decision to train and less via the traditional precautionary
savings channel.
In the quantitative analysis we compared three different economies,
the Aiyagari-like economy, the career risk only economy and the baseline
calibration economy. Such a comparison is convincing in that all three
economies endogenously generate the same life-cycle pattern of labor in-
come variance even when they have extremely different aggregate macro-
economic implications. In the Aiyagari-like economy and the career risk
only economy, incomplete markets have very small quantitative effects.
On the contrary, the baseline calibration economy with higher weight on
specialization risk, market incompleteness decreases labor quality dramati-
32Investment in human capital in our model is captured by the time allocated to training.
In the first period, time devoted to training relative to output (τˆ0/yˆ) decreases by 19.2
percentage points. The decrease is lower in the second period, 0.6 percentage points. Thus
the overall decrease in investment in human capital relative to output is 19.8 percentage
points.
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cally and all other aggregate variables are also impacted considerably. Thus
depending on the weights of the two shocks, the quantitative implications
of incomplete markets could be as large as our baseline case or as small as
the case with only career shocks. Unless empirical studies isolate the rel-
ative weights of these shocks in the data, it is hard to take a stand on the
exact role of market incompleteness.
4.2.4 Robustness analysis
Here we evaluate whether our quantitative findings are robust to alterna-
tive calibrations of the elasticity parameter φ and the depreciation rate of
human capital δh. Table 4, panels A and B, presents results where we vary
each parameter one at a time while holding the other parameters fixed at
values discussed in the previous section.
By increasing the return elasticity of training, φ equals 0.9, the quanti-
tative effects of market incompleteness become more pronounced for the
baseline calibration economy. For example, relative to the complete mar-
kets benchmark, average labor quality falls by 60 percent, capital and la-
bor fall by 23 and 30 percent respectively and aggregate output declines
by 27 percent. As before, the quantitative effects remain insignificant in
the stationary equilibrium of the career risk only economy. Lower annual
depreciation rate of human capital, 2 percent, does not change our quan-
titative results appreciably, see Table 4, panel B. Relative to the complete
markets benchmark, market incompleteness due to career risk continues
to have small effects whereas these effects stay large for the baseline cali-
bration economy. Average labor quality declines by 42 percent relative to
the complete markets benchmark and as a result output, capital and labor
are lower in the baseline calibration with a lower rate of human capital de-
preciation. However, not surprisingly, lower depreciation rate of human
capital in fact raises the average labor quality in the stationary equilibria of
all calibrated economies, row 1, panel B, Table 4.
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TABLE 4. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
Complete markets Incomplete markets
Career risk only Baseline calibration
φ = 0.9
Panel A
xˆ 0.171 0.171 0.067
kˆ 1.223 1.226 1.359
Kˆ/Yˆ 3.925 3.931 4.181
Cˆ/Yˆ 0.761 0.761 0.746
Lˆ/Yˆ 0.401 0.401 0.385
Rˆ 1.036 1.031 1.036
wˆ 1.496 1.497 1.560
Yˆ 4.372 4.377 3.178
δh = 0.02
Panel B
xˆ 0.240 0.241 0.139
kˆ 1.253 1.255 1.364
Kˆ/Yˆ 3.983 3.987 4.191
Cˆ/Yˆ 0.758 0.757 0.745
Lˆ/Yˆ 0.397 0.397 0.380
Rˆ 1.035 1.035 1.031
wˆ 1.510 1.511 1.563
Yˆ 5.557 5.565 4.347
Table 4: Robustness analysis with respect to the return elasticity of training
and the depreciation rate of human capital are reported in panels A and B
respectively. All other parameters are held fixed at their initial calibrated
values.
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TABLE 5. TIME IN TRAINING
Complete markets Incomplete markets
Career risk only Baseline calibration
Panel A
τˆ0 0.683 0.684 0.202
τˆ1 0.066 0.067 0.054
Panel B
τˆ0 0.683 0.193
τˆ1 0.066 0.049
Table 5: Fraction of one unit of time devoted to training in the first two
periods of the life-cycle. No time is allocated to training thereafter. Panels
A and B report general equilibrium and partial equilibrium results respec-
tively.
4.3 Life-cycle features of the model
In this section we take a closer look at the underlying training and asset
holding decisions in different calibrated economies with human capital ac-
cumulation – career risk only and baseline calibration economy. In these
economies, the training and asset holding decisions are identical for all the
agents within a generation. However, within generation heterogeneity due
to different realization of the shocks generates a distribution of earnings
and consumption for each cohort. As a result, we also explore the cross
sectional distribution of earnings and consumption implied by our model.
4.3.1 Individual decisions
Time allocated to training as a fraction of one unit of time in the first two
periods of the life-cycle, where each period corresponds to eight years, is
reported in Table 5. Panel A reports the overall effects whereas panel B
isolates the partial equilibrium effects of idiosyncratic uninsurable human
capital risk by holding wage and interest rate fixed at the complete markets
level.
In the case when there is no uncertainty, agents spend 6 years in train-
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ing, 5.5 years between the age 16  24 and half a year between 24  32.33
When labor income uncertainty is due to career risk, the time allocated
to training does not change much relative to the complete markets bench-
mark, see column 3, panel A. However, in the baseline calibration where
specialization risk plays a central role, agents train for 2 years, 1.6 and 0.4
years in the first and second periods respectively. Relative to the complete
markets benchmark, training is merely 1/3 which is why labor quality is
dramatically lower in the stationary equilibrium of the baseline calibration
economy. As noted earlier this is a striking result.
Panel B evaluates the direct impact of risk on an individual’s training
decision when we hold wage and interest rate fixed at the complete mar-
kets level. From the two period case discussed in section 3 we know that
career risk does not directly influence the training decision. This is vali-
dated here in column 3, panel B as the level of training in the career risk
only economy is the same as in the complete markets benchmark, column
2, panel A. However, in the baseline calibration economy, time devoted to
training is even lower relative to the comparable case in panel A. Reducing
the time allocated to training lowers efficiency units but at the same time
it increases the time supplied to the labor market by an individual. Thus
the overall impact on the equilibrium wage rate is ambiguous in a general
equilibrium setting. However, we know that the wage rate increases in the
baseline calibration economy relative to the complete markets benchmark,
see Table 3. Not allowing the wage rate per efficiency unit to increase in
panel B partly explains why training is lower in this panel in relation to the
corresponding column in panel A.
The decision to hold risk-free assets for precautionary purposes when
markets are incomplete has been studied extensively. Figure 2 shows that
the asset holding as a fraction of the total income increases over the work-
ing life of an agent, irrespective of whether markets are complete or not.
One reason is that agents accumulate human capital when young and there-
33Time devoted to training in the first period is 0.683  8 = 5.5 years. Similarly training
in the second period is 0.066  8 = 0.5 years.
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Figure 2: Life-cycle pattern of asset holding as a fraction of total income in
the different economies for the general equilibrium and the partial equilib-
rium (PE) case.
fore their asset holdings are relatively low in the earlier part of their life-
cycle. Figure 2 also shows that the asset holding decision gets distorted by
risk, a common result in this literature. Agents tend to save more when
markets are incomplete for precautionary purposes. Consequently, in both
economies, the career risk only economy and the baseline calibration econ-
omy, real assets are higher relative to the case when markets are complete.
In a partial equilibrium setting, in both economies asset holding as a frac-
tion of total income is higher relative to their corresponding general equi-
librium economies with incomplete markets, implied by equation (19), al-
beit marginally in the career risk only economy.34
Therefore, both decisions, the decision to train less and the decision to
save more allow agents to self-insure against uninsurable idiosyncratic hu-
man capital risk. In addition, the large quantitative effects for the baseline
calibration economy are primarily due to the partial equilibrium effects of
34For the partial equilibrium case, total income is computed using prices, wage and in-
terest rate, from the stationary equilibrium of the complete markets economy.
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Figure 3: The left graph plots mean labor income and the right plots the variance
of logarithm of the labor income over the life-cycle in the different economies.
idiosyncratic uninsurable human capital risk on these endogenous deci-
sions.
4.3.2 Life-cycle pattern of income and consumption
Figure 3 compares the distribution of life-cycle earnings generated by our
model with the data. The solid line in the left graph of Figure 3 is the age
effects in mean earnings according to the estimates of Huggett, Ventura
and Yaron (2007). Following Huggett, Ventura and Yaron (2007), we scale
the mean labor income such that at the end of an agent’s work life mean
labor income is 100. The average labor income generated by our general
equilibrium model has the familiar hump shape which is seen in the data.
However, our model generates the hump in the earlier periods of the life-
cycle, close to age 30, but in the data labor earnings peak when agents are
in their mid 40s. One reason for this mismatch could be that in our model
we do not allow labor quality to increase due to reasons other than school-
ing, like on-the-job training, learning by doing and other mechanisms that
improve labor quality over the entire working life of an agent. Not sur-
prisingly, the variance of the logarithm of labor earnings, the right graph in
Figure 3, matches data in all the different economies that we consider since
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Figure 4: The left graph plots mean consumption in the two economies alongwith
+/  2 standard deviation bands which suggests that negative consumption is a
rare event in these economies. The right graph plots the variance of the logarithm
of consumption.
we calibrated the risk to match this aspect of the data.
Our model does not match the moments of life-cycle consumption data
very well. In our specification the two shocks have a normal distribu-
tion and consumption is residual. This suggests that in our quantitative
analysis there can be some instances for which consumption is negative.
The bands in the left graph of Figure 4 for mean consumption contain
95% of the values suggesting that the shocks in our model are sufficiently
small to preclude high incidences of negative consumption. Mean age-
consumption in our model has an upward slope, a common implication
of life-cycle models with additively separable utility function defined over
consumption alone. Bullard and Feigenbaum (2007) argue that inclusion
of both consumption and leisure in the utility function would produce a
hump-shaped consumption along with a U-shaped leisure profile, given a
hump-shaped life-cycle productivity pattern. Comparing the consumption
inequality over the life-cycle generated by our model to Deaton and Pax-
son’s (1994) measure of consumption inequality in the data, we find that
our model generates higher consumption volatility relative to data even
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when we account for just 1/3 of the variance in labor earnings.35 Storeslet-
ten, Telmer and Yaron (2004) suggest that without a social security system,
variance in consumption is roughly 20% higher relative to data. In this
model there is no form of social insurance and that could partly explain
high consumption variance. Another reason that our model generates high
consumption variance is that an agent’s endogenous decisions are unaf-
fected by the actual realization of the two shocks. This causes consumption
to be residual and therefore more volatile. Apart from being more volatile,
the variance of consumption generated by the model is concave whereas in
the data it is somewhat linear. In the model when agents are young, they
accumulate human capital which is risky and their holdings of risk-free as-
sets are relatively low. As a result shocks to training have a larger impact on
consumption in the early periods of the life-cycle. Over time as holdings of
risk-free asset increases, human capital shocks tend to have a lower impact.
Overall, in both the economies, the life-cycle consumption implications of
our model do not match data very well. By incorporating leisure, allowing
for wealth effects and introducing some form of social insurance, we could
potentially correct the implications of our model for consumption.
Even though the aggregate implications of these two economies with
incomplete markets, the career risk only economy and the baseline cali-
bration economy, are undoubtedly very different, the life-cycle features are
somewhat similar. The two economies endogenously generate the same
life-cycle pattern of labor income variability. Other life-cycle features, such
asmean labor income, mean consumption and the variance of consumption
over the life-cycle are also not very different across these two economies.
One reason could be that these divergent decisions occur only in the early
part of the life-cycle and their influence gets smoothed over many periods
thus understating the striking differences in the endogenous decisions in
the two economies with incomplete markets.
35Deaton and Paxson (1994) use consumption data from the Consumption Expenditure
Survey (CEX), 1980-1990. They remove the cohort effects from the data when measuring
the age-profile of consumption inequality over the life-cycle. See Deaton and Paxson (1994)
for further details.
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5 Conclusion
This paper studies the impact of uninsurable idiosyncratic human capital
risk, using a Ben-Porath version of production function for human capital,
in a general equilibrium life-cycle model. Our results indicate that unin-
surable idiosyncratic human capital risk alone is not enough to generate
large quantitative macroeconomic effects, contrary to the earlier findings
in this literature. The nature of risk, career versus specialization, is crucial
in determining the quantitative implications of market incompleteness for
the aggregate economy. Calibrated stationary equilibrium with only career
risk has properties similar to Aiyagari (1994) reconfirming the long held be-
lief that the quantitative implications of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk are
inconsequential. However, our baseline calibration with high weight on
the specialization risk clearly illustrates that market incompleteness could
have large, quantitatively significant, macroeconomic implications. Sta-
tionary equilibrium in this case is severely distorted relative to the com-
plete markets benchmark.
Based on our quantitative analysis, we conclude that in order to com-
ment on themacroeconomic effect of uninsurable idiosyncratic human cap-
ital risk, empirical studies based on micro data would need to determine
the relative weights of these shocks in data. Even though the life-cycle fea-
tures generated by our model for different calibrations of risk are not very
different, the decision to train is particularly dissimilar in these economies.
This dissimilarity in the level of education is primarily due to specializa-
tion risk. Empirical cross country studies estimating risks associated with
different types of education that require varying degrees of specialization
could however be indicative of the level of specialization risk that exists
in these countries. Such studies could thereby alert us about the likely ex-
tent of distortion in these countries due to uninsurable idiosyncratic human
capital risk.
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